Details

Subgame Consistent Cooperation

A Comprehensive Treatise
Theory and Decision Library C, Band 47

von: David W.K. Yeung, Leon A. Petrosyan
96,29 €
Verlag:	Springer
Format:	PDF
Veröffentl.:	23.09.2016
ISBN/EAN:	9789811015458
Sprache:	englisch

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Beschreibungen

Titelbeschreibung

<p>Strategic behavior in the human and social world has been increasingly recognized in theory and practice. It is well known that non-cooperative behavior could lead to suboptimal or even highly undesirable outcomes. Cooperation suggests the possibility of obtaining socially optimal solutions and the calls for cooperation are prevalent in real-life problems. Dynamic cooperation cannot be sustainable if there is no guarantee that the agreed upon optimality principle at the beginning is maintained throughout the cooperation duration. It is due to the lack of this kind of guarantees that cooperative schemes fail to last till its end or even fail to get started. The property of <i>subgame consistency</i> in cooperative dynamic games and the corresponding solution mechanism resolve this “classic” problem in game theory. </p><p>             This book is a comprehensive treatise on subgame consistent dynamic cooperation covering the up-to-date state of the art analyses in this important topic. It sets out to provide the theory, solution techniques and applications of subgame consistent cooperation in a wide spectrum of paradigms for analysis which includes cooperative dynamic game models with stochastic state dynamics, with uncertain future payoffs, with asynchronous players’ horizons, with random cooperation duration, with control spaces switching and with transferable and nontransferable payoffs. The book would be a significant research reference text for researchers in game theory, economists, applied mathematicians, policy-makers, corporate decision-makers, and graduate students in applied mathematics, game theory, decision sciences, economics and management sciences.<br></p><p></p>

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Introduction.- Subgame Consistent Cooperative Solution in Differential Games.- Subgame Consistent Cooperation in Stochastic Differential Games.- Subgame Consistency in Randomly-Furcating Cooperative Stochastic Differential Games.- Subgame Consistency under Asynchronous Players’ Horizons.- Subgame Consistent Cooperative Solution in NTU Differential Games.- Subgame Consistent Cooperative Solution in Dynamic Games.- Subgame Consistent Cooperative Solution in Random Horizon Dynamic Games.- Subgame Consistency in Randomly-Furcating Cooperative Stochastic Dynamic Games.- Subgame Consistency under Furcating Payoffs, Stochastic Dynamics and Random Horizon.- Subgame Consistency in NTU Cooperative Dynamic Games.- Applications in Cooperative Public Goods Provision.- Collaborative Environmental Management.- Cooperation with Technology Switching.- Applications in Business Collaboration

Autorenportrait

Back cover copy

Strategic behavior in the human and social world has been increasingly recognized in theory and practice. It is well known that non-cooperative behavior could lead to suboptimal or even highly undesirable outcomes. Cooperation suggests the possibility of obtaining socially optimal solutions and the calls for cooperation are prevalent in real-life problems. Dynamic cooperation cannot be sustainable if there is no guarantee that the agreed upon optimality principle at the beginning is maintained throughout the cooperation duration. It is due to the lack of this kind of guarantees that cooperative schemes fail to last till its end or even fail to get started. The property of <i>subgame consistency</i> in cooperative dynamic games and the corresponding solution mechanism resolve this “classic” problem in game theory. <div><br></div>This book is a comprehensive treatise on subgame consistent dynamic cooperation covering the up-to-date state of the art analyses in this important topic.It sets out to provide the theory, solution techniques and applications of subgame consistent cooperation in a wide spectrum of paradigms for analysis which includes cooperative dynamic game models with stochastic state dynamics, with uncertain future payoffs, with asynchronous players’ horizons, with random cooperation duration, with control spaces switching and with transferable and nontransferable payoffs. The book would be a significant research reference text for researchers in game theory, economists, applied mathematicians, policy-makers, corporate decision-makers, and graduate students in applied mathematics, game theory, decision sciences, economics and management sciences. <div><br></div><div>"Technically this is a high quality book. It is very relevant to researchers of dynamic games – an area which is very relevant in nowadays research related to complex dynamic systems. The book provides original concepts, ideas and results with relevance."<br></div><div><br></div><div> —<i> Dusan Stipanovic</i><br></div><div><br></div><div><div>“The 2004 Nobel Economics Prize was given to works in economic policies under the concept of time consistency with mathematical construction less general, rigorous and precise than that later developed in this book. The concept and technique of subgame consistency were just published then. In terms of advancement in practical applications this book is highly important theoretically and technically on top of economic interpretation.”</div><div><br></div><div> —<i> Vladimir Mazalov</i></div></div><div><br></div><div><br></div>

Sonderbeitrag

Provides a comprehensive coverage of subgame consistent cooperation Presents solution techniques for complex subgame consistent cooperation Equips readers to design sustainable collaboration plans Illustrates applications in business, environmental study and public goods provision Enriches the study of cooperative dynamic games

Verkaufsargumente

Unpublished endorsement

“As a researcher in game theory and strategic relationships, I found this book a pioneering, fundamental and comprehensive treatise on dynamic cooperation theory and applications. The seminal concept of cooperative subgame consistency originated by the authors was expounded and applied in many scenarios and practical applications. It is not only an excellent reference but a classic to be of the field. With growing issues involving subgame inconsistency in intertemporal cooperation regionally and globally -- like global climate change treaties, Brexit, nuclear war threats, internal trade agreements – the book is deemed to be a must read for researchers and policy-makers. The book is truly a signal publication in mathematical and economic sciences with contributions deserving the award of world top prizes.” (Professor Sardar M N Islam, Professor of Business, Economics and Finance, College of Business Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia)      